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C ~ n ~ t i t ~ t Law-SUBSTANTIVE
i~nd
DUEPROCESS-ABORTIONAND REPORTING
REREASONABLE
STATUTORY
RECORDKEEPING
QUIREMENTS UPHELD-PlannedParenthood V. Danforth, 96 S. Ct.
2831 (1976).
Planned Parenthood, a not-for-profit corporation, and two
Missouri physicians brought suit in 1974 requesting injunctive
relief from the operation of a new Missouri abortion statute and
challenging its constit~tionality.~
The action challenged provisions, applicable to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, requiring
a patient's written consent for an abortion, spousal consent for an
abortion, and parental consent prior to performing an abortion on
unmarried minors. The action also challenged provisions defining
viability, requiring the physician to exercise professional care to
preserve the fetus' life and health, declaring an infant who survives an abortion that was not performed to save the mother's life
or health to be a ward of the state, prohibiting the saline amniocentesis method of abortion after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, and prescribing reporting and recordkeeping requirements
for health facilities and for physicians performing abortions.
A three-judge federal district court held all the challenged
provisions valid except the requirement that physicians exercise
professional care to preserve the life and health of the fetus.' On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the provisions requiring spousal and blanket parental consent, prohibiting
the saline amniocentesis method of abortion, and requiring physicians to exercise professional care to preserve the fetus were unconstitutional. The provisions defining viability, requiring the
patient's consent, and prescribing reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, however, were ~ p h e l dThe
. ~ scope of this case note
will be confined to issues raised by the reporting and recordkeeping requirements of the Missouri statute.

The Supreme Court and many of its academic critics agree
--

1. 96 S. Ct. a t 2835. The statute, Mo. ANN. STAT.$ § 188.010-.085 (Vernon Supp.
1976), was drafted to replace Missouri's previous abortion legislation, which was declared
unconstitutional in 1973 as a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 96 S. Ct. a t 2835. The suit, naming
John C. Danforth, Attorney General of Missouri, and the Circuit Attorney of St. Louis as
defendants, was filed three days after the new law became effective. Id.
2. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
3. 96 S. Ct. at 2838-48. The Court declined (on grounds of standing) to decide the
constitutionality of the provision declaring an infant who survives an abortion not performed to save the mother's life or health a ward of the state. Id. a t 2838 n.2.
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that judicial review of abortion legislation is bottomed on substantive due process theory.' This oft denounced theory has undergone a long and turbulent development, including a period of
virtual extinction. The standards applied under its rubric have
experienced a similar h i ~ t o r y . ~
A.
1.

Standards Applied in Substantive Due Process Analysis
The old substantive due process

The old substantive due process culminated in Lochner u.
New York,"he infamous symbol of economic due process, which
propounded a reasonableness standard for determining the validity of state legislation:
[Tlhe question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and
appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an
unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the
right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into . . .
contracts . . . ?'
In short, Lochner demanded that both the end and the means of
legislation must affirmatively be shown to be reasonable?
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), held that the
right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.
Id. at 153 (emphasis added), quoted in instant case, 96 S. Ct. a t 2837. Academic support
for this view can be found in Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 83-85; Ely, The Wages of Crying
L.J. 920 (1973) (denunciation of Roe); Epstein,
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP.CT. REV.
159 (criticism of Roe); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The
Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.689 (1976) (defense of
Roe and Doe v. Bolton).
5. See G . GUNTHER,CASESAND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW548-656 (9th ed.
1975); Dixon, supra note 4, a t 43; Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 A m . L. REV.419 (1973).
6. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a detailed history and analysis of the Lochner philosophy,
see Strong, supra note 5, a t 419.
7. 198 U.S. a t 56.
8. The Court also stated:
The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end
itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid
which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person
and in his power to contract . . . .
Id. a t 57-58.
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Although Lochner and most similarly decided subsequent
cases of its era involved the application of substantive due process
theory to invalidate legislation regulating the economic sphere,@
the Court also made significant use of the theory in reviewing
noneconomic legislation.1° In this field, too, the Court employed
a reasonableness standard to adjudicate the constitutionality of
legislation: "[Rlights guaranteed by the Constitution may not
be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State."ll
The effectual demise of economic due process occurred in the
l%O's, l2 and the reasonableness standard, although remaining
essentially unchanged in its verbal configuration, deteriorated
into a "minimum rationality" test that involved no meaningful
scrutiny of legislation affecting economic rights.13 Minimum rationality, also known as the rational relation or rational basis test,
began with the premise that "the law need not be in every respect
logically consistent with its aims to be con~titutional."~~
This
test, therefore, required merely that "there [be] an evil a t hand
for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it? In keeping
with this spirit of judicial laissez faire, the Court, after Nebbia
v. New York16 and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,17 invariably
-

- - -

9. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908). During the period from 1905 to the mid-1930's, nearly 200 economic
regulations were ruled unconstitutional, but a larger number withstood constitutional
attack. G. GUNTHER,
supra note 5, at 564-65.
10. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court held unconstitutional a
Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages below the eighth grade.
The decision was based on the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of liberty, including "the
right of the individual . . . to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God . . . , and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized a t common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
Id. at 399. Similarly, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), invalidated an
Oregon law that required all children to attend public schools.
11. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). Similar language is used in
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400, 403 (1923). Both of these decisions have escaped
much of the artillery aimed at the Lochner approach.
12. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
13. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.
supra note 5, a t 591-92; McCloskey,
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); G. GUNTHER,
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP.
CT. REV.34.
14. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
15. Id. at 488.
16. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
17. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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succeeded in finding that economic regulation had at least a minimally rational relation to some legitimate state purpose.lR

2. The new substantive due process
In the realm of "personal" rights, substantive due process
faded with the passing of the Lochner eralQnd was seldom
invoked20 until its spectacular regeneration in Griswold v. Conn e ~ t i c u t Griswold
.~~
held that a law forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded upon the "right of privacy"
of an i n d i v i d ~ a lAlthough
.~~
Justice Douglas explicitly declined to
adopt Lochner as a guide and based the decision on penumbras
and emanations from the Bill of Rights,23in light of language from
Roe u. WadeU to the effect that the right of privacy is founded
on the "Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action,"25 Griswold must realistically be
viewed as resting most comfortably on a substantive due process
f o u n d a t i ~ n .The
~ ~ Court in Griswold applied the "familiar
principle . . . that a 'governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedom^."'^^
The strictness of the Griswold standard became fully apparent when the Court announced its decision in Roe v. Wade eight
18. G. GUNTHER,
supra note 5, at 591; McCloskey, supra note 13, a t 34.
supra note 5, a t 619.
19. G. GUNTHER,
20. The substantive due process methodology can be detected in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (law requiring sterilization of larceners and
certain other habitual criminals held unconstitutional, although technically on equal
protection grounds) and in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (holding
that denial of passports to members of Communist organizations violates due process).
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. Id. a t 485.
23. Id. at 482-85.
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. Id. a t 153.
L. REV.
26. Dixon, supra note 4, a t 83-84; Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM.
1410, 1427 (1974).
27. 381 U.S. a t 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307
(1964)). Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Brennan, emphasized the extent of protection afforded "fundamental liberties"
with notions and language borrowed from equal protection cases:
"Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State
may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling,"
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,524. The law must be shown "necessary, and
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196.
381 U.S. a t 497.
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years later. Roe held that the "right of personal privacy includes
the abortion decision,"28that only "fundamental" rights are included in the right of personal privacy,2gthat regulation limiting
fundamental rights "may be justified only by a 'compelling state
interest,' . . . and that legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests a t stake."30
Borrowing the compelling state interest test from equal protection cases, where its invocation has uniformly resulted in the
invalidation of legi~lation,~'
results in scrutiny of abortion legislation on a much stricter level than the old substantive due process
standards of reasonableness and minimum rationality would
have required." Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,"
resulted in the substantial invalidation of the criminal abortion
laws of nearly every state?

B.

Constitutional Attacks on Reporting and Recordkeeping
Provisions of the New Abortion Statutes

In the wake of Roe and Doe, state legislatures drafted new
laws governing abortions. Widespread attacks on these new abortion statutes included constitutional challenges of reporting and
recordkeeping requirements prescribed by some of them. The
court decisions in these cases are almost evenly divided-some
upholding the provisions, others striking them down.
1. Authority upholding reporting and recordkeeping provisions
Probably the most determined assault on a reporting provi28. Id. a t 154.
29. Id. at 152.
30. Id. a t 155.
31. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAW.L. REV.1,89 (1972); Lee, Mr. Herbert Spencer and the Bachelor Stockbroker: Kramer u. Union Free
School District No. 15, 15 ARIZ. L. REV.457, 465 (1973). As Chief Justice Burger has
pointed out:
Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the "compelling state
interest" standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law
has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever
will, for it demands nothing less than perfection.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
supra note 5, at 637-38; Ely, supra note 4, a t 935.
32. G . GUNTHER,
33. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
34. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139-40 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 18182 (1973). For a classification and discussion of abortion laws as of 1972, see Comment, A
Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The Contradictions and the
Problems, 1972 U . ILL. L.F.177.
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sion to date was that brought in Schulman u. New York City
Health and Hospitals C ~ r p .in, ~which
~
New York's highest court
held that a regulation requiring reporting of names and addresses
of abortion patientss6 was "rationally related and narrowly tailored to the compelling State interest in maternal health."37 Obediently applying the compelling state interest test prescribed by
Roe u. Wade,38the court struggled to rationalize its conclusion in
the face of vigorous dissents by three of the seven justices.39 In
attempting to demonstrate that the name reporting requirement
was rationally related and narrowly tailored to the compelling
state interest in maternal health, the majority devoted much of
its opinion to a discussion of the general benefits of abortion
reporting, most of which, as the dissenters pointed out, could
probably be accomplished equally well without reporting of
names. The court relied heavily on the absence of direct proof
t h a t the name requirement dissuaded women from procuring
abortions,40while the dissent insisted that the "chilling effect" of
name reporting on the right to an abortion was patently evident.41
The majority's only attempt to reconcile first trimester abortion
reporting with Roe's ban of first trimester regulation was an observation that reporting enables health officials "to determine
whether second trimester abortions are being falsely reported as
first trimester abortion^."^^ The dissenting justices protested that
such reasoning "obliterates completely the careful distinctions
between the two trimesters drawn by the Supreme
Applying the "less restrictive alternative" requirementd4of the
35. 38 N.Y.2d 234, 342 N.E.2d 501, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1975), a f f'g 44 App. Div. 2d
482, 355 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1974).
36. The New York City Board of Health prescribed the form and content of the
pregnancy termination certificate pursuant to N.Y. CITYHEALTHCODE$4 204.03, .05.
37. 38 N.Y.2d a t 245,342 N.E.2d a t 507,379 N.Y.S.2d a t 710. The court emphasized
CODE§ 204.07 protecting the confidentiality of such
the importance of N.Y. CITYHEALTH
records. 38 N.Y .2d a t 237,240,244,342 N.E.2d a t 502,504,507,379 N.Y .S.2d a t 703,706,
710. For further discussion of confidentiality requirements, see notes 116-127 and accompanying text infra.
38. Notes 28-32 and accompanying text supra.
39. 38 N.Y.2d a t 245-57,342 N.E.2d a t 507-15,379 N.Y.S.2d a t 710-21. The majority's
difficulty in rationalizing its holding is largely attributable to the use of the compelling
state interest test with its strong "presumption" of unconstitutionality. If the court had
been free to apply a standard of reasonableness with a neutral weighing of interests, i t
could have reached the same result with relative ease. See notes 99-106 and accompanying
text infra.
40. 38 N.Y.2d a t 240, 342 N.E.2d a t 504, 379 N.Y.S.2d a t 706.
41. Id. a t 253-54, 342 N.E.2d a t 513-14, 379 N.Y.S.2d a t 718-19.
42. Id. a t 239, 342 N.E.2d a t 503, N.Y.S.2d a t 705.
43. Id. a t 253, 342 N.E.2d a t 513, N.Y .S.2d a t 718.
44. This requirement is discussed a t notes 74-80 and accompanying text infra.
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compelling state interest test, the dissent concocted a scheme for
compiling abortion data according to coded numbers instead of
patients' names, yet the plan included a means of identifying
patients by name.45The net result of such a plan is needless
complication with no real increase in protection of privacy. Other
courts that have upheld similar reporting provisions have apparently been able to do so with much less difficulty than that experienced by the New York court.48
2. Authority holding reporting and recordkeeping laws unconstitutional

A decision representative of those that have invalidated reporting and recordkeeping requirements is Hodgson v.
Anderson," which held that extensive abortion regulations (including recording and reporting rules) issued by the Minnesota
State Board of Health48were uncon~titutional.~~
The major reasons for the court's conclusion were the statute's failure to ex45. 38 N.Y.2d a t 247,342 N.E.2d a t 509, N.Y.S.2d a t 712.
46. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2846-47, aff'g392 F. Supp.
1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 184, 201, 204 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1374 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd,96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (upholding
the portion of a provision that required reporting of an abortion patient's name, address,
age, and date of abortion while striking down portions that required reporting of the
spouse's name and address, names of parents of unmarried minor abortion patients, and
facts showing the necessity of abortion); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky.
1974), reu'd on other grounds, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976) (upholding a statute requiring
reporting of abortions performed after the first trimester, but ruling that reporting of the
patient's street address was impermissible). In none of these cases was there a dissent from
the holding that reporting requirements passed constitutional muster.
47. 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed for want of juris. sub nom.
Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903 (1975), reu'd in part per curium sub nom. Hodgson v.
Lawson, No. 74-1569 (8th Cir., Oct. 6, 1976) (recordkeeping requirements directed to
preservation of maternal health that respect patients' privacy are permissible regardless
of stage of pregnancy). Other decisions that have invalidated reporting laws include
Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975) (entire body of regulations struck down for failure to
exclude first trimester of pregnancy from regulation); Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th
Cir. 1974) (entire act invalidated for failure to exclude first trimester from regulation and
lack of legitimate relationship to state interests); Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534
(M.D. Pa. 1975) (striking down entirely the reporting provisions upheld in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F.
Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973) (entire abortion statute held unconstitutional although two of
the three judges regarded the reporting provisions as constitutional).
48. The text of the regulations appears in 378 F. Supp. a t 1020-28. The regulations
STAT.ANN. 5
were issued by the Minnesota State Board of Health pursuant to MINN.
145.413(1) (West Supp. 1976).
49. 378 F. Supp. a t 1018.
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clude first trimester abortions from regulation, the unnecessary
extra layer of complex regulation not reasonably related to maternal health, and the singling out of abortion for special regulation
that tended to chill the abortion decision.50It is important to
note, however, that although Hodgson invalidated the regulations
issued pursuant to the Minnesota statute,51the statute itself,
which authorized the board of health to promulgate appropriate
regulations to effect a system for reporting abortions, was left
largely intact .52

In the instant case, appellants argued that Missouri's reporting and recordkeeping provisions were unconstitutional because
they imposed an extra layer and burden of regulation on abortions and because they applied throughout all stages of pregnancy. The Court responded to the first objection by conceding
that there may be "conflicting interests affected by recordkeeping
requirements," but it concluded that "[rlecordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient's
confidentiality and privacy are perrnis~ible."~~
In addition, although the Court stated that it could "see no legally significant
impact or consequence on the abortion decision or on the
physician-patient relati~nship,"~~
it warned against abusive or
excessive use of recordkeeping "in such a way as to accomplish,
through the sheer burden of recordkeeping detail, what we have
held to be an otherwise unconstitutional re~triction."~~
The second objection to the recordkeeping provisions, that
they applied throughout all stages of pregnancy, was dismissed
with little explanation. Appellants argued that the state, in the
first trimester of pregnancy, cannot impose any recordkeeping
requirements that differ significantly from those imposed on comparable medical procedures. The Court's cursory response to this
argument was that the recordkeeping provisions, "while perhaps
50. Id.
51. MINN.
STAT.ANN. § 145.413(1) (West Supp. 1976).
52. 378 F. Supp. at 1012, 1016, 1018.
53. Since this case note is confined to the topic of abortion reporting requirements,
this section will discuss only the small portion of the Court's opinion that dealt with such
requirements. The bulk of the opinion was devoted to more controversial issues such as
spousal and parental consent.
54. 96 S. Ct. at 2846.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2846-47.
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approaching permissible limits, are not constitutionally offensive
in them~elves."~'In support of this conclusion, the Court observed that recordkeeping could be useful in protecting health
and "may be a resource that is relevant to decisions involving
medical experience and judgment."58 It further pointed out that
recordkeeping had no apparent significant impact on the abortion
decision and that Missouri physicians were also required to participate in reporting births, deaths, communicable diseases, and
use of controlled substance^.^^

The selection of a standard to apply in constitutional adjudication is a crucial choice-one that often decides the ultimate
issues before the standard is brought to bear upon the facts of a
particular case.60In order to evaluate the soundness of the decision in the instant case, it is first necessary to analyze the alternative standards in an attempt to arrive at a conclusion as to which
standard is most appropriate in this and similar cases involving
substantive due process.

A.

Compelling State Interest Test

The Supreme Court has declared that the right of privacy is
a "fundamental right,"" that the right of privacy includes the
right to an abortion,62and that a regulation limiting fundamental
rights can be justified only by a compelling state interest." Thus,
in the instant case, the Court could have opted to apply the strict
compelling state interest test. The use of this strict approach,
however, shifts the initial focus of judicial scrutiny away from the
reasonableness of legislation and places it on the individual right
involved, to determine whether it is a fundamental right, i.e., a
. ~ ~ determination is inright deserving of special p r o t e c t i ~ n This
herently arbitrary and subjective since the Court has failed to
prescribe any useful criteria for deciding which rights are funda57. Id. at 2846.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2846 & n.13.
60. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
61. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152 (1973).
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
63. Id. at 155.
64. Lee, supra note 31, at 465.

986

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

mental.65Moreover, some fundamental rights are apparently
more fundamental than others? The technique of classifying
some rights as fundamental is further confused by the fact that
a given right may be characterized in different ways or regarded
as being derived from different sources. A right that is fundamental under one characterization may not be fundamental under a
different characterization. For instance, the plaintiffs in
Schulman challenged abortion reporting requirements under
three theories: (1)that the reporting of names of abortion patients
infringes the right to an abortion, (2) that it violates the right to
privacy connected with the use of one's name, and (3) that it
violates the physician-patient privilege." These theories may be
regarded as different characterizations of the same body of rights.
While the first characterization is regarded as a fundamental
right, the others are not likely to be so regarded by the courts.
Once the right in question is classified as fundamental, the
state can justify its infringement only by showing a compelling
state interest. Thus, another semantic imponderable arises: Is the
interest that the state has asserted to justify the challenged
regulation a compelling interest or merely a legitimate one? Roe
u. Wade announced that maternal health is a compelling interest,
but only after the first trimester of pregnancy." It also announced
that a state's interest in preserving fetal life is not compelling
until the fetus becomes "viable" at approximately 24-28 weeks of
65. Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIZ.L. REV.479,
505-06 (1973). Goodpaster concludes that only four classes of rights are fundamental: first
amendment rights, political participation rights, and rights to due process and equal
protection. He excludes, however, the right of privacy and the right to travel, both pronounced fundamental by the Supreme Court. Id. a t 428-83.
66. Although first amendment rights are regarded as fundamental, Roe gave the
"right to abortion" more rigorous protection than the First Amendment receives. See
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) ("[aldvertising, like all public expression,
may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest"); Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (holding that a prison regulation requiring that mail
from attorneys to inmates be opened by prison officials in the presence of the inmates did
not violate the constitutional rights of prisoners); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 115 (1972) (discussing the right to use a public place for expressive activity, the Court
said, "[olur cases make equally clear, however, that reasonable 'time, place and manner'
regulations may be necessary to further significant governmental interests, and are
permitted"); Ely, supra note 4, at 935.
67. 38 N.Y.2d a t 237 & n.1, 342 N.E.2d at 502 & n.1, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 703 & n.1.
68. 410 U.S. at 163. This conclusion was explicitly based on medical data tending to
show that mortality in abortion during the fiist trimester "may be less than mortality in
normal childbirth." Id. The possibility thus remains that the state could regulate first
trimester abortions under certain circumstances if they were shown to be more dangerous
than normal childbirth.
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pregnancy? The Court in Roe sought to balance the public interests of maternal health and fetal life against the private interests
of autonomy and privacy, but the Court kept a heavy thumb on
the private side of the scales by invoking the compelling state
interest test with its virtual presumption of uncon~titutionality.~~
If the state's interest in limiting a fundamental right is
deemed compelling, then the state must show an appropriate
relationship between the questioned regulation and the compelling interest. Some commentators and courts have insisted that
to satisfy the required relationship the regulations limiting the
right to abortion must be necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest," but this formulation of the test may be
overly strict. Roe v. Wade required only that, after the first stage
of pregnancy, regulations limiting the right to abortion must be
reasonably related (rather than necessary) to a compelling state
interest, such as maternal health.7zThe apparent difference between these two formulations of the test may not be as great as
it first appears, however, since Roe added that "legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests a t stake."73
The additional qualification that abortion legislation must
be narrowly tailored to legitimate interests is generally included
in the verbal baggage of the compelling state interest test7jin one
or more of its variations, including " ~ v e r b r e a d t h , " "less
~ ~ (or
least) drastic means,"76"less restrictive alternative, "77 "precision
--

69. 410 U.S. a t 160, 163.
70. Notes 28-32 and accompanying text supra.
71. E.g., Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 250,
342 N.E.2d 501, 511, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702, 715 (1975) (dissenting opinion); Comment, In
Defense of Liberty: A Look at the Abortion Decisions, 61 GEO.L.J. 1559,1569 (1973); Note,
Roe and Paris: Does fiivacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN.L. REV.1161, 1166-67, 1172-73
(1974). As used in these sources, "necessary" is synonymous with "indispensable."
72. 410 U.S. a t 164. Doe v. Bolton also required the relationship to be reasonable
rather than necessary. 410 U.S. 179, 194-95 (1973).
73. 410 U.S. a t 155. Establishing that the two formulations are in fact identical
appears to be as hopeless as answering a philosopher's riddle.
74. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716-18 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
75. E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973); United States v. Robel, 389 U S .
258, 262, 265-66 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508, 514 (1964).
76. E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,268 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960). For a discussion of this concept, see Note, Less Drastic Means and the
First Amendment, 78 YALEL.J. 464 (1969) (concluding that the doctrine is not a useful
tool).
77. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716-18 (1974). For exhaustive discussion
of this principle, see Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic
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of r e g u l a t i ~ n , "and
~ ~ "nece~sity."~~
Although these variations are
intended to articulate a requirement of precision of regulation,
the requirement is far from precise in both theory and practice.
Its primary usefulness is in emphasizing the strictness with which
the Court scrutinizes a particular law.80
As one constitutional law scholar observed in commenting on
the compelling state interest language of Roe v. Wade,
All of this terminology may be no more than an elaborate
way of saying that the validity of a statute burdening the interest in privacy is determined by weighing the extent of the burden against the importance of the state interests. If so, the language changes nothing. It may, however, suggest a more mechanical approach: if the interest in privacy is burdened,
whether substantially or not, the regulation must be necessary
to achieve a compelling state interest. Such an interpretation
would tend to extend to the interest in privacy a measure of
protection greater than that normally accorded other constitutionally protected interest^.^'

Despite the Supreme Court's concern for the weighing and balancing of competing interests,82the Court's use of such absolutist
language as "fundamental right," "compelling state interest,"
and "narrowly drawn" has led many lower courts into the error
of mechanically granting the right to abortion and the right of
"privacy" an inordinate and undeserved protection that exceeds
the protection granted to such long-standing rights as those guaranteed by the First Amendment.83Even the Supreme Court has
Due Process, 80 HAW. L. REV. 1463 (1967); Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in
Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND.
L. REV.971 (1974).
78. E.g.,NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
79. E.g.,Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
80. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972) (using the terms "necessary,"
"precision," "tailored," and "less drastic means" as makeweights to justify extremely
strict scrutiny in that case).
81. Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More Modest Role
for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.89, 121.
82. Notes 99-108 and accompanying text infra. This concern for balancing can also
be detected in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
83. Note 66 supra. In Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974), a St. Louis
ordinance regulating abortion clinics was struck down in its entirety because the court was
not persuaded that it was "necessary to protect either the state's interest in maternal
health or future life" and because i t failed to exclude the first trimester of pregnancy from
regulation. Id. at 1351. In Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505
F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975), Chicago health regulations
governing abortions were declared invalid for the same reasons. The court conceded that
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often been guilty of using the compelling state interest standard
in a rigid, mechanical way in equal protection cases.84In view of
its tendency to obfuscate important issues and to mechanically
overprotect abortion and other rights, the compelling state interest test and most of its verbal baggages should be discarded, a t
least in the abortion context.86

B. Minimum Rationality
The toothless minimum rationality test applied in Nebbia v.
New Yorkg7and subsequent economic due process cases purports
to require that legislation be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest? Although this test contains the same language
used frequently to strike down legislation during the Lochner
period, it has come to represent 'a virtual abdication of judicial
scrutiny by indiscriminately upholding legislation of dubious valid it^.^^ It is highly unlikely that the Court, in the near future, will
apply the minimum rationality test to abortion legislation since
that test represents the polar opposite of the compelling state
the regulations might be upheld under the traditional "rational relationship" standard,
but it mechanically invoked the fatal compelling state interest test. Id. a t 1150. Another
Pa.
instance of the mechanical approach is Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (M.D.
1975), in which all the challenged provisions of Pennsylvania's abortion statute were
declared unconstitutional. Lower courts have overprotected abortion in the sense that they
have frequently invalidated laws similar to those sustained in the instant case. See, e.g.,
notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
84. Note 31 and accompanying text supra.
85. Notes 61-80 and accompanying text supra.
86. In commenting on Roe u. Wade, one scholar observed:
Even in cases that do not give rise to the devilish questions of what counts as a
person, the term "compelling state interest" is an analytical snare of no modest
proportions. But here . . . the phrase is but a plaything of the judges, an excuse
but never a reason for a decision.
Epstein, supm note 4, a t 184-85. See Goodpaster, supra note 65, a t 483,513-14 (advocating
a reasonableness-balancing standard for most rights, including privacy); Perry, supra note
4, at 733 n.203 (concluding that the compelling state interest test had no place in resolution of the fundamental issue in Roe u. Wade of whether abortion regulation intruded on
a matter outside the scope of public morals).
Although it is hazardous to prognosticate, it appears that the Court's approach in
Danforth, notes 99-108 infra, coupled with the marked absence of compelling interest
language in that opinion and the Court's recent showing of distaste for strict scrutiny in
equal protection and First Amendment cases, suggests that the Court is scuttling the
compelling state interest test. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (declining to
apply the overbreadth test and applying a reasonableness test in a first amendment case),
noted in 61 CORNELL
L. REV.640 (1976); G. GUNTHER,
supra note 5, a t 839-88; Gunther,
supra note 31, a t 17-21, 37-38.
87. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
88. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 9-18 and accompanying text supra.
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interest test of Roe v. Wade.goMinimum rationality, however,
merits discussion because of the possibility, however remote, that
some courts may read the instant case as applying a minimum
rationality standard.
In the instant case, the Court obviously employed a much
stricter degree of scrutiny than that which the minimum rationality test entails, since the Court held most of the challenged MisUnder the minimum rationalsouri provisions uncon~titutional.~~
ity approach, the Court could have upheld all the provisions challenged by demonstrating that "there [was] an evil at hand for
correction, and that it might be thought t h a t the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."92
Minimum rationality would not be a desirable standard for
review of abortion legislation because it suffers from the same
kinds of defects that plague the compelling interest standard.93It
has degenerated into a mechanical approach that announces,
rather than explains, the result; it makes a proper balancing of
interests impossible by overloading one side of the scales;" and
it ignores important factors such as the degree of infringement of
private rights and the importance (or unimportance) of the
state's interest in regulation. Because of these defects, minimum
rationality and the compelling state interest test should, and possibly will, be abandoned. Although these tests may be valid as
they
extreme endpoints of a general standard of reasonablene~s,~~
are superfluous because the general standard encompasses them.
Their tendency to become crystallized as general standards in
many contexts and the misleading effect of the compelling state
interest test on lower courts support the view that they should be
discarded. The recent development of the "newer" equal protec90. In the context of equal protection, however, the Supreme Court has recently
breathed new life and meaning into the rationality test. In its rejuvenated form, it is a
neutral standard involving genuine scrutiny that commonly includes a balancing of interests. Gunther, supra note 31, at 17-21. This modem standard, as applied in the context
of substantive due process, will be discussed in text accompanying notes 99-129 infra.
91. Notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
92. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
93. Notes 65-66, 81-86 and accompanying text supra.
94. Notes 13-18 and accompanying text supra.
95. One constitutional law scholar reasoned:
[Bloth the "rational" basis standard and the strict scrutiny standard of due
process and equal protection review are wrong as general standards. They describe instead specific instances of application of a general standard, reasonableness review. They are the respective end points of the continua of due
process and equal protection review.
Goodpaster, supra note 65, at 513-14.
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tion's rationality standard lends credence to the suggestion that
the Court may abandon both the minimum rationality and the
compelling state interest tests in other contexts as well.96

C . Reasonableness Standard with Balancing of Interests
The appropriate standard for reviewing abortion legislation
(and other legislation within the purview of substantive due process) is necessarily a vague one since attempts to formulate more
A standard of
precise standards seem largely counterprod~ctive.~~
reasonableness, although vague, has served long and faithfully in
American jurisprudence in numerous contexts. The reasonableness standard in constitutional adjudication requires that legislative ends and means be fair and reasonable as seen in the light
of a neutral weighing and balancing of the interests of the state
against the interests of persons whose rights are jeopardized by
the legislation in question.gs
In the instant case, the Supreme Court appears to have applied such a reasonableness standard in arriving at its determination that Missouri's statutory provisions for the reporting of abortions were constitutionally valid? In reaching its conclusion that
"[rlecordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that
properly respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible,"loOthe Court sought to weigh the interests of the abortion patient against the interests of the state. Relevant interests
of the patient include the qualified right to an abortion without
undue regulation,lO'the right of privacy regarding information
about oneself,'02 and the freedom from interference in the
96. The newer equal protection's rationality standard bears a superficial resemblance to minimum rationality in that it uses the same "rational relation" language, but
the Court has recently used the rationality standard in numerous cases to invalidate
legislation that would have easily survived minimum rationality scrutiny. In those cases,
the Court carefully avoided the use of compelling state interest language and genuinely
scrutinized the challenged legislation to ensure that it was indeed rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest. Note 90 supra.
97. Notes 61-86 and accompanying text supra.
98. See Goodpaster, supra note 65, a t 512-15.
99. The Court did not explicitly announce the standard it chose to apply, but its
language is much more suggestive of a neutral reasonableness standard with balancing of
interests than of a compelling state interest approach that requires the state to select the
least restrictive alternative.
100. 96 S. Ct. a t 2846.
101. Id. a t 2837.
102. Although the Court never explicitly mentioned this "right" in the Danforth
opinion, the Court's emphasis on respect for a patient's "confidentiality and privacy,"
id. a t 2846, reveals that this right was being protected.
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physician-patient relationship.lo3Relevant state interests include
preserving maternal health and life and monitoring abortions to
ensure that they are performed in conformity with the law.lo4
After considering these competing interests, the Court concluded that the balance struck by the Missouri law was acceptable and reasonable. As to private interests, the Court said that
as long as useful recordkeeping is not abused or overdone and
privacy and confidentiality are protected, abortion recordkeeping
has "no legally significant impact or consequence on the abortion
decision or on the physician-patient relationship,"lo5and privacy
of information is likewise uninfringed. As to state interests, the
Court chose not to speak in terms of absolutes, but deferred to
the legislature's judgment that the law was reasonable by observing that "maintenance of records indeed may be helpful in developing information pertinent to the preservation of maternal
health."lo6
Further evidence of the reasonableness-balancing standard
can be found in portions of the opinion that dealt with other
provisions of Missouri's abortion statute. First, with respect to
the issue of spousal consent, the Court weighed paternal rights
against the mother's rights and concluded that "[slince it is the
woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the
two, the balance weighs in her favor."lo7Second, in resolving the
parental consent issue, the Court weighed the interests of the
state, the minor, and her parents and decided that "[alny inde-

-

103. Id. at 2846.
104. Id. The Court noted that the latter interest (which is largely dependent upon
the existence of other interests, especially the interests in maternal health and fetal life)
"fades somewhat into insignificance in view of our holding above as to spousal and parental consent requirements." Id. In other words, the state could no longer require execution
of spousal and parental consent forms. The state's interest in monitoring abortions, however, retains significance in view of provisions requiring the patient's written consent, Mo.
ANN.STAT.§ 188.020(2) (Vernon Supp. 1976)' requiring the physician's certification that
the fetus was not viable, id. § 188.030, and requiring the patient's certification that she
has been informed that her parental rights may be in jeopardy if the fetus survives, id.
9§ 188.040, .045. The Court's implicit recognition of the state's interest in monitoring
abortions may be significant in that it tends to discredit the common assumption that
the state can regulate abortions in the second trimester only in ways reasonably related
to maternal health. Rw u. Wade did not say that maternal health was the only state
interest worthy of recognition. See 410 U.S. a t 162-64.
105. 96 S. Gt. at 2846.
106. Id. In the next paragraph the Court added that "[rlecordkeeping of this kind
. . . can be useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its female citizens,
and may be a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and
judgment." Id. (emphasis added).
107. 96 S. Ct. a t 2842.
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pendent interest the parent may have in the termination of the
minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of
privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become
pregnant. "'OR
While many may disagree with the relative weight the Court
assigned to the competing interests, it is significant that a balancing approach was utilized rather than a narrow, mechanical application of compelling state interest jargon. It is also significant
that the Court's holding as to the spousal and parental consent
provisions applies only to the first twelve weeks of pregnancytog
and that the Court left room for a parental veto, given sufficient
justification, even in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.ltoThe
significance of these facets of the instant case lies in the fact that
the Court has not foreclosed the possibility that a different balance may be struck in subsequent stages of pregnancy, under
different statutory schemes, or when medical knowledge has
added greater insight into abortion issues.
By using a reasonableness-balancing approach, the Court
was able to reach a sound conclusion as to the validity of the
reporting provision of Missouri's abortion statute. Unhampered
by the compelling state interest test and its distorting influence,''' the Court recognized that the reporting law struck a reasonable balance between the state's interest in maternal health
and the patient's interest in privacy and autonomy. Although the
Court did not expound on the relationship between reporting
abortion information and preserving the health of pregnant
women, the possible dangers and deleterious consequences of
abortions, including cervical scarring, subsequent miscarriages
and premature births, sterility, menstrual complications and
neurosis,112
amply justified the Missouri legislature in prescribing
reporting and recordkeeping requirements in order to develop
data relevant to maternal health. This data may prove extremely
valuable as a means of enhancing physicians' medical judgment
and enabling patients to approach the abortion decision with
greater awareness of its consequences. Indeed, it would be absurd
-

108. Id. at 2844. The Court has apparently failed to distinguish between physical and
emotional maturity. Justice Blackmun surely does not believe that pregnancy is proof of
one's emotional maturity.
109. Id. at 2841-44.
110. Id. at 2844.
111. See Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 342
N.E.2d 501, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1975); notes 38-46 and accompanying text supra.
112. See O'Meara, Abortion: The Court Decides a Non-Case, 1974 SUP.CT.REV.337,
346-47; Comment, The Case of Abortion, 52 J. URB.L. 277, 335 (1974).

994

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

to deny states the opportunity to collect medical data concerning
abortion, a medical procedure that involves serious dangers and
permanent aftereffects, some of which are probably yet unknown.
Abortion reporting provisions seem especially reasonable in view
of the fact that state laws commonly require the reporting of
certain communicable diseases to aid in protecting public health,
even though such reporting tends to invade personal privacy.l13
While the state's interest in maternal health lends vital support to the constitutionality of abortion reporting requirements,
proper analysis requires equal consideration of the rights of
women who elect to undergo an abortion. The typical objection
to abortion recording and reporting regulations is that they tend
collaterally to deter the exercise of the right to an abortion by
exposing the abortion patient to the threat that her abortion may
become public knowledge.l14Despite the subjective nature of this
argument, there can be little doubt that a t least a few women
would hesitate to procure an abortion, would use a false name,
would seek an illegal abortion, or would even forego an abortion
entirely because of their reluctance to risk public exposure. In the
instant case, the Court obviously weighed this concern in the
balance, as evidenced by the Court's emphasis on the protection
of the patient's confidentiality and privacy.l15 Second-guessing
the Supreme Court is a difficult and risky enterprise, but it appears that the confidentiality provision of the Missouri abortion
law116was a crucial factor.l17
A close examination of the fate of similar reporting provisions
in other courts supports the thesis that confidentiality provisions
are essential to the validity of reporting requirements. In every
113. E.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT.ANN.8 19-89 (West 1969) (requiring physicians to report
cases of cholera, yellow fever, typhus fever, leprosy, smallpox, diphtheria, typhoid fever,
scarlet fever, syphilis, gonorrhea, chancroid, and other communicable diseases).
114. See Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 240,
255-56, 342 N.E.2d 501, 504, 513-14, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706, 718-19 (1975); Note,
Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74
COLUM.
L. REV.237, 247-48, 251 (1974).
115. 96 S. Ct. at 2846.
116. Mo. ANN.STAT.$ 188.055(3) (Vernon Supp. 1976) provides in pertinent part:
All information obtained by physician, hospital, clinic or other health facility from a patient for the purpose of preparing reports to the division of health
under this section or reports received by the division of health shall be confidential and shall be used only for statistical purposes. Such records, however, may
be inspected and health data acquired b y local, state, or national public health
officers.
The st.atute also provides that breach of confidentiality is a misdemeanor. Id. § 188.070.
117. See 96 S. Ct. a t 2846.
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instance in which reporting requirements were upheld, the challenged regulations included a provision protecting the confidentiality of abortion patients.l18 Of decisions that invalidated reporting requirements, about half involved regulations that failed
to provide for confidentiality;llgthe other half were typically decisions that held abortion statutes or ordinances unconstitutional
as a whole, without individual consideration of reporting requirements.120
A difficult question of degree might arise if an abortion patient should insist that a particular confidentiality provision fails
to adequately protect confidentiality, either because the provision does not sufficiently restrict access to the patient's records
or because the provision is frequently ignored in practice.121The
balancing approach, however, has sufficient flexibility to accommodate this objection and allow it to be properly weighed in light
of the facts of the particular case.
Unlike the regulations in the instant case, some abortion
reporting laws do not require the patient's name and address to
be r e ~ 0 r d e d .Such
l ~ ~ regulatory schemes clearly avoid the problem
of confidentiality, but it appears that the constitutional "right
118. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (implicitly sustaining a Georgia regulation
requiring reporting of abortions and providing for confidentiality); Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (upholding a portion of a provision
that required reporting of patient's name, address, age, and date of abortion and that
protected confidentiality); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976) (upholding a reporting statute that did not
require reporting of names and ordering that patient's street address not be reported);
Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 342 N.E.2d 501, 379
N.Y.S.2d 702 (1975) (sustaining regulations requiring reporting of patient's name and
address and providing for confidentiality).
119. Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974) (invalidating entire abortion
ordinance that included name reporting requirement but did not provide for confidentiality); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973) (striking down entire statute
containing provision requiring extensive reporting without protecting confidentiality, but
two of the three judges felt that the reporting provision was constitutional).
120. Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (M.D.
Pa. 1975) (slight individual consideration of reporting requirements); Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed for want of juris. sub nom.
Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903 (1975), rev'd per curium sub nom. Hodgson v. Lawson,
No. 74-1569 (8th Cir., Oct. 6, 1976).
121. For discussion of practical difficulties in maintaining confidentiality of medical
records, see Boyer, Computerized Medical Records and the Right to Privacy: The Emerging Fedeml Response, 25 BUFFALO
L. REV.37 (1975); Comment, Information Privacy:
Constitutional Challenges to the Collection and Dissemination of Personal Information by
Government Agencies, 3 HASTINGS
CONST.L.Q. 229 (1976).
122. E.g., KY. REV.STAT.§ 213.055 (Supp. 1976), construed in Wolfe v. Schroering,
388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974); S.D. COMPILED
LAWSANN.§ 34-23A-19 (Supp. 1976).
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of privacy" does not require the state entirely to forego gathering
any abortion information that might identify the patient. In
Schulman, the court rejected the argument that reporting the
patient's name and address violated the right of privacy.123The
dissenting justices, however, were convinced that the state's interest in gathering statistical data relevant to maternal health
could be adequately recognized without reporting names and
addresses
In the instant case, the Court did not explicitly deal with the
state's interest in obtaining names and addresses of abortion patients, but it implicitly recognized such an interest in holding
that reporting of abortions is permissible if the patient's confidenl~~
the patient's name,
tiality and privacy are ~ r 0 t e c t e d . Without
the state would, as a practical matter, be unable to develop statistical information concerning the medical consequences of repeated abortions performed on the same woman.126Since existing
data suggest that repeated abortions threaten to impair the patient's health,12' the state should have the opportunity to facilitate collection of further information as to the effects of repeated
abortions by requiring reporting of patients' names and addresses
(in addition to medical information), as long as confidentiality is
preserved.
In summary, a reasonableness standard that includes a
neutral weighing of interestslZ8was probably the test employed
by the Court to reach the sound conclusion that "[rlecordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed
to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect
a patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible."lB The
Court apparently found Missouri's abortion reporting provisions
reasonable and valid because the state's interest in gathering
data relevant to maternal health outweighs the patient's interest
in keeping information about her abortion completely off the
record.
123. 38 N.Y.2d at 240, 242-44, 342 N.E.2d at 504, 506-07, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 706, 70809.

124. Id. at 245-57, 342 N.E.2d at 508-15, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 710-21.
125. 96 S. Ct. at 2846.
126. See notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra.
127. O'Meara, supra note 112, at 346-47.
128. "Neutral" is used here to suggest a weighing of interests without the distorting
influence of either the compelling state interest test, which overemphasizes the rights of
the individual, or the minimum rationality approach, which affords individual rights
almost no protection.
129. 96 S. Ct. at 2846.
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D. Reporting Allowed at All Stages of Pregnancy
Perhaps the most unexpected aspect of the Court's holding
with respect to abortion reporting requirements is the Court's
approval of a statute requiring reporting a t all stages of pregnancy,'" despite strong language in Roe v. Wade proscribing any
regulation of first trimester abortions.l3l A possible explanation
for this result is that the impact on the patient of reporting is so
insignificant (when confidentiality is protected) that reporting
requirements cannot be said to limit or regulate abortion at all.132
However, such an explanation lacks cogency in light of the
Court's concern for balancing interests and finding a reasonable
relation to maternal health.133If there were no possibility that
reporting might significantly infringe the right to abortion, the
Court would have had no occasion to justify reporting by invoking
the state's interest in maternal health.
Another possible, and more plausible, explanation for the
Court's approval of first trimester reporting is that the Supreme
Court, beleaguered by well-reasoned attacks on its ban of first
' ~ ~ be laying the foundation for a circumtrimester r e g ~ l a t i o n ,may
spect retreat from the stance of Roe v. Wade. This view is supported by the Court's holding that a provision requiring the patient's written consent to her own abortion in the first twelve
.~~~
during
weeks of pregnancy is not u n c o n ~ t i t u t i o n a lRegulation
the first stage of pregnancy, strangely, is consistent with the holding of Doe v. Bolton (the companion case to Roe), which involved
the challenge of a Georgia statute containing reporting provisions
130. Id.
131. In Roe the Court held that, in the first trimester of pregnancy,
the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine,
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's
pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may
be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.
410 U.S. a t 163 (emphasis added).
132. In Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), the Court said:
Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling. . . .

....

. . . When it is shown that state action threatens significantly to impinge
upon constitutionally protected freedom i t becomes the duty of this Court to
determine whether the action bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its justification.
Id. a t 524-25 (emphasis added).
133. 96 S. Ct. a t 2846.
134. E.g., Ely, supra note 4, a t 942 n.117; Epstein, supra note 4, a t 181-83.
135. 96 S. Ct. a t 2839-40.
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similar to M i s s o ~ r i ' s .Under
~ ~ ~ Georgia's law, reporting was also
required during the first stage of pregnancy,ls7 yet the Court in
Doe did not invalidate the reporting provision.138Since it seems
unlikely that this discrepancy between Roe and Doe was due to
oversight, it is possible that the Court felt that reporting was
merely a procedural regulation governed by less stringent standards than those applicable to substantive regulation of abort i o n ~ , or
' ~ ~the Court may have overstated its point in Roe u.
Wade. 140
A more satisfactory justification for the seemingly contradictory judicial endorsement of reporting requirements for abortions
performed in the first stage of pregnancy rests in part upon Roe
u. Wade's holding that for the first stage of pregnancy, "the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical
judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician."141In the
instant case, the Court observed that recordkeeping data "may
be a resorce that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment."142 These two statements in juxtaposition,
coupled with an awareness of the dangers and serious medical
consequences of abortions,143offer a sound basis for permitting the
state to collect data concerning abortions in order to enhance the
attending physician's medical judgment, as well as to enable the
pregnant woman to cope more intelligently with the abortion de136. 410 U.S. at 181-84.
137. See GA. CODEANN.9 26-1202(b)(7)-(9) (1972). The statute makes no exception
for first trimester abortions. This statute was replaced in 1973 by one containing similar
reporting provisions. Id. § 26-1202(d) (Supp. 1976).
138. 410 U.S. a t 184, 201.
139. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U S . 113, 165 (1973), the Court made reference to its
consideration of "procedural requirements" in Doe. One might infer that the Court regarded Roe as dealing with laws that prohibit abortion (substantive regulation), while it
regarded Doe as dealing with laws that impose certain conditions on the performing of
abortions (procedural regulation). See Note, The Abortion Cases: A Return to Lochner,
or a New Substantive Due Process?, 37 ALB.L. REV.776,794-95 (1973). In the instant case,
however, the Court said that, after the first stage of pregnancy, the state could adopt
"substantive as well as recordkeeping regulations that are reasonable means of protecting
maternal health." 96 S. Ct. a t 2846. This statement clearly does not fit such a substanceversus-procedure dichotomy because it does not use the word "substantive" to denote a
prohibition of abortion. Any kind of a substance-procedure dichotomy in abortion regulation would probably be extremely difficult to maintain with any integrity because the
distinction is based more on semantics than rational analysis. Therefore, the distinction
does not appear to be a sound basis for applying different constitutional standards to
abortion regulations.
140. see note 131 and accompanying text supra.
141. 410 U S . at 164.
142. 96 S. Ct. a t 2846.
143. See text accompanying notes 112-113 supra.
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cision. With regard to first trimester regulation of abortion, the
enormous advantage of a balancing technique over a mechanical
jurisprudence is evident: the Court can weigh the relevant factors
in the balance and reasonably and justifiably conclude that reporting of first trimester abortions ought to be permitted.

